final level of grammatical relations. This principle is implicit in most theories other than RG, since the use of multiple levels by RG is what most distinguishes it from other theories (cf. Perlmutter 1982). In fact, the inability to refer to syntactic levels other than the final one is built into most other theories; it is often unclear how these theories might treat the phenomena which RG handles by reference to non-final levels. But the fact that other theories do not allow reference to such levels is indicative of the unusual nature of such phenomena.
A second markedness principle is the following. This principle is stated here in an extremely vague fashion, but deliberately so. Exactly what constitutes transparency 'from surface evidence' is left open; but I hope the basic intent of the principle will become clear below. It is aimed at minimizing analyses which refer to grammatical relations that may be wellmotivated for other languages, but which are of dubious motivation in the language being analysed. The effect of the Transparency Principle, as I appeal to it below, will be to rule out (at least in normal cases) a certain class of abstract analyses.
A third markedness principle is less controversial, and is implicit in much generative theory.
(5) NATURAL CLASS PRINCIPLE: If a class of nominals is referred to by grammatical rules in many languages, then an adequate theory should treat it as a natural class. Analogs of this principle have a long history in generative phonology-in which it has long been assumed that, if a class of sounds is referred to by phonological rules in many languages, then an adequate theory of features should provide a natural way to characterize these sounds.3
The arguments below will occasionally appeal to these markedness principles. Two points should be borne in mind about the role of these. First, they are in general empirical hypotheses; thus it is only because languages seem generally to conform to the Final Level Principle that it is a viable markedness principle.4 Similarly, Hawkins' Cross-Category Harmony Principle can be interpreted as such a principle, and it is clearly empirical.5
Second, markedness principles characterize only typical cases. The fact that a particular analysis violates a markedness principle provides an argument against that analysis only if there is reason to believe that the phenomenon being described is typologically normal. I assume that violations of markedness principles are acceptable in unusual or atypical cases; thus I accept an analysis 3 It is worth noting that some of the notions of subject discussed by Perlmutter 1982 violate the spirit of the Natural Class Principle. For example, he defines a 'working 1' (working subject) as a nominal which is a subject at some level and a term at the final level. RG at present apparently does not provide a NATURAL way to characterize working subjects. A theory would be preferred that did not need to employ a definition like the one Perlmutter proposes. 4 The Final Level Principle could be falsified if it were shown that languages do not generally conform to it-that rules referring to non-final levels are not in fact unusual. But showing that a construction is cross-linguistically normal or unusual requires a methodology distinct from those generally employed in syntactic investigation. In principle, it would require careful collection of data for a suitable sample of languages, taking problems of genetic and areal bias into consideration. At the present stage of research, it is clear that no systematic evidence of this sort is available to support the Final Level Principle; it is simply an hypothesis based on my own impressions. But what would falsify it should be clear: a carefully selected sample of languages in which the majority of rules refer to non-final levels. Admittedly, it remains unclear EXACTLY what states of affairs would falsify it. (Is a situation normal if it holds in only 60% of cases?) As an initial approximation, one might characterize a situation as cross-linguistically normal if the number of cases in which it occurs is greater, with statistical significance, than the number of cases in which it does not. 5 But some characteristics of markedness, such as the Natural Class Principle, seem to be nonempirical methodological principles. of verb agreement in Achenese that refers to initial subjects, because verb agreement in Achenese is apparently unusual.
2. INDIRECT OBJECT ADVANCEMENT. The object of study of this paper is semantically ditransitive sentences in English and other languages, like the sentences in 6-7. The classical treatment of these English sentences in RG is: (6) John gave the book to Mary.
Su DO IO (7)
John gave Mary the book.
Initial Su IO DO Final Su DO Chomeur A sentence like 6 is considered basic in the sense that it involves a single syntactic level, while 7 is non-basic in that it involves two levels-an initial level, at which the grammatical relations are identical to those in 6, and a final level, at which the initial IO is the final DO, and the initial DO a final chomeur.6 In other words, sentences like 7 involve a rule of Indirect Object Advancement, whereby an IO advances to become the DO. (I will argue later for an alternative analysis of these sentences.) Analyses similar to that just described for 6-7 have been proposed for analogous pairs of sentences in other languages, such as the following: John PERF give the book to Mary. 'John gave the book to Mary.' French would be described in RG as a language lacking 10 Advancement.7
In a number of other languages, however, the single construction for clauses containing notional 10's resembles the construction in English sentences 6 The evidence given for analysing Mary in 7 as final DO includes the fact that, for most speakers, the only passive of 7 is one in which Mary has advanced to Su: Mary was given the book by John, rather than ?*The book was given Mary by John (see Frantz 1981 , Postal 1982 'I see their canoe.' (p. 159) Note that the verb in 10 is transitive animate, indicating the animacy of the notional 10 za:bdi:s 'John' rather than the inanimacy of the notional DO mzinhigan 'book'. The properties of the object-marking can be described as follows:
(12) In transitive clauses containing a notional DO but no 10, the object affix represents the notional DO. In clauses containing both a notional IO and a notional DO, the object affix represents the notional IO. Rhodes accounts for these facts by positing obligatory 10 Advancement. Since such advancement is obligatory in Ojibwa on his analysis, the initial JO za:bdi:s 'John' will be the final DO, and the initial DO mzinhigan 'book' will be a final chomeur. Thus the facts in 12 can be described by this rule: (13) The object affix represents the final DO. Analyses similar to that of Rhodes for Ojibwa have been proposed for a number of other languages, e.g. Cree (Jolley 1982) , Mohawk (Postal , 1982 , and Tzotzil (Aissen 1983). Two observations about such an analysis are in order here. First, it violates the Transparency Principle discussed above: it is opaque in that we have no surface evidence that mzinhigan 'book' in 10 is ever a DO, or that za:bdi:s 'John' is ever an JO. In other words, on the basis of surface evidence alone, one would conclude that a grammatical relation of Ojibwa groups the notional JO in ditransitive clauses with the single object in monotransitive clauses; but one would not conclude that any grammatical relation groups the notional DO in ditransitive clauses with the single object in monotransitive clauses. Such a grammatical relation might be motivated by analogy to other languages, or even by semantic relations, but not by the surface evidence of Ojibwa.8 Such considerations have led others to dismiss analyses like that of Rhodes. In discussing a similar set of facts in Huichol (Uto-Aztecan, Mexico), Comrie 1982 rejects an obligatory IO Advancement analysis by appealing to a general methodological principle similar to the Transparency Principle. He requires that grammatical relations used in grammatical descriptions be justified language-internally. It is unclear, however, exactly what constitutes such justification. According to Borg & Comrie (1984:109) , it involves 'demonstrating that each identified grammatical relation represents a clustering of syntactic properties in the language, sufficient to justify the internal cohesion of the grammatical relation and to set it off from other grammatical relations'. But this seems far too strong: instances in which only one rule in a language refers to a particular grammatical relation would be rendered LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. It seems a mistake to decide such issues on a-priori grounds, since the question is ultimately an empirical one. It is certainly a possibility that Rhodes' analysis is an accurate characterization of the grammar internalized by Ojibwa speakers. Even though the surface evidence alone would presumably not lead Ojibwa speakers to such an analysis, it is not inconceivable that they do arrive there either on the basis of semantic roles (since the role of the notional DO in such clauses is the same as that of prototypical DO's) or on the basis of innate knowledge of grammatical relations. However, if (as I argue below) constructions like that in Ojibwa are rather common cross-linguistically, then it might be worthwhile to try to find an alternative analysis for them. As with markedness principles in general, violations of the Transparency Principle are acceptable in unusual cases, but unacceptable in describing typologically common constructions.
A second observation to be made about analyses like that of Rhodes for Ojibwa is that they introduce an unexplained asymmetry into the theory. That is, even though there are languages like Ojibwa that have been analysed as having obligatory IO Advancement, there are no languages which have been analysed in RG as having obligatory passive. Why should this be true? The answer is that, if passive were to become obligatory in a language, then the language would be analysed as having become ergative. For example, if passive became obligatory in English, then what is now the final subject would be used for notional objects of transitive verbs, and for notional subjects of intransitive verbs. D. Johnson 1977 argues that a language with an obligatory passive rule would be unstable, and would undergo reanalysis to become ergative; and Chung 1978 claims that such reanalysis did occur in Tongan and Samoan when passives acquired a frequency much higher than actives. The Transparency Principle predicts that, as a language approaches having an obligatory passive, it is likely to be reanalysed. A language with obligatory passive may be possible, but it will be typologically unusual. The instability of such languages presumably results from the opacity of their grammars; their reanalysis by speakers the kind of surface evidence that would render an analysis like that of Rhodes more transparent. As far as I can determine, however, none of the rules discussed by Rhodes are of that sort. He assumes an early derivational RG framework with rule ordering, and the rule of 10 Advancement apparently precedes all rules that refer to objects; hence no rule applies to what are initial DO's on his analysis. is a reflection of a tendency to assign an analysis that conforms to the Transparency Principle.
If languages which develop an obligatory passive rule are unstable, and likely to be reanalysed as ergative, then it seems plausible that languages which develop an obligatory IO Advancement rule should also be unstable, and are likely to be reanalysed to some more transparent analysis. I will now offer an identification of that more transparent analysis.
3. PRIMARY OBJECT AND SECONDARY OBJECT. The central proposal of this paper is that, just as some languages employ the grammatical relations ERGATIVE and ABSOLUTIVE, which can be defined in terms of subject and object-as in n' Actually, Aissen argues that the facts are best accounted for by a rule stipulating that Tzotzil has no final 10's, rather than stipulating that 10 Advancement is obligatory. However, the effect is the same for the purposes of this paper; her analysis still violates the Transparency Principle. 'Brutus stabbed Caesar.' The case-marking here reflects directly the fact that the original ergative nominal ('Brutus') has become absolutive. The fact that the original absolutive ('Caesar') has become a chomeur is reflected both by its taking on oblique casemarking, and by the fact that the verb no longer agrees with it: the verb in 34 agrees with both nominals, but in 35 it agrees only with the absolutive nominal. This illustrates the fact that Antipassive, like Passive, decreases the syntactic valence of a clause.
The advancement rule corresponding to the third pair in 29 above is the familiar one of 10 Advancement, also known as Dative. I will say nothing more about it at this point.
The remainder of this section will be devoted to arguing for the existence of an advancement rule corresponding to the fourth pair in 29. This rule involves the advancement of an SO to become a PO, the original PO thereby becoming a chomeur. I will call this rule ANTIDATIVE, since it bears the same relation to the dative rule that Antipassive bears to Passive. I will argue that Antidative 13 I differ here from the most widely accepted approach to antipassive in recent RG work. Most analyses follow Postal 1977 in treating antipassive as a sequence of two rules: demotion of subject to object, and subsequent re-promotion to subject. The difference hinges largely on views of the theoretical status of grammatical relations like ergative and Primary Object; I discuss this in ?8 below.
is a very common rule cross-linguistically-and that, in fact, it occurs in English. In RG, Sally is here the initial subject, but a final chomeur. This corresponds to the description of Sally in other frameworks as the 'logical subject', but not the 'grammatical subject'; grammatically it is just the object of a preposition. My treatment of PP's with to in clauses like 37b is analogous: Mary is the logical 10, but not a grammatical 10; grammatically, it is just the object of a preposition. Restricting the term 'indirect object' (as applied to English) only to nominals without a preposition, like Mary in 37a, has precedents in other descriptive approaches; thus it is defended by Mallinson & Blake (124-5).
Consider again the classical
My arguments for the Antidative Analysis are based on the fact that it permits the statement of various rules of English to be simpler, as well as more consistent with markedness principles. Consider first the 'case-marking' rules of English, which presumably specify which nominals occur with prepositions. Compare the case-marking required under the two analyses. erence to a non-final level. This would be acceptable if Eng. word-order rules were unusual; but as I show below, they are not. 4.3. In principle, one would need a diverse and genetically unbiased sample of languages to test whether a given rule is normal. I will assume here, however, that it is initially plausible to consider a construction cross-linguistically normal if one shows that a small sample of languages from different language families and different parts of the world exhibit the properties in question. I will thus argue that the case-marking and word-order rules of English are crosslinguistically normal because a small but diverse sample of languages apparently exhibits very similar rules.
As noted above, for example, Indonesian has two constructions for clauses containing IO's; they bear a remarkable similarity to the two English constructions in their case-marking, word order, and other syntactic properties. 19 The analysis given here thus seems to bring Southern Tiwa into line with all other languages in which the verb can agree with three nominals. In such languages, the three nominals seem always to be Su, DO, and 10. the literature has shown that ergativity is not really a property of languages, but rather a property of rules. The term 'split ergativity' is used to describe instances in which some rules in a given language refer to the grammatical relations SUBJECT Because case-marking in Inuktitut follows an ergative pattern, the fact that the object has advanced to become the subject in 52b is somewhat opaque, since Maali occurs in the absolutive case in both clauses. However, it is in the absolutive in 52a because it is an object, in 52b because it is an intransitive subject. This is reflected more clearly by the properties of Piita: in 52a, it occurs in the ergative case and the verb agrees with it, both facts being indicative of its subject status. But in 52b, it occurs in the oblique ablative case, and the verb no longer agrees with it-both facts being indicative of its chomeur status.
There is evidence that primary objectivity also is really a property of rules, rather than of entire languages. In some instances, within a given language, some rules refer to the DO/IO distinction, others to the PO/SO distinction. In Southern Tiwa, for example, the PO/SO distinction is relevant to various rules, However, in imperative sentences the DO occurs in the nominative case, which 20 The PO/SO distinction is also relevant to noun incorporation in Southern Tiwa, howeverin that a DO that is an SO always incorporates, but a DO that is a PO sometimes does not, depending on various factors. 21 Let us return to the main idea of this section, namely that primary objectivity is a property of individual rules, rather than of entire languages. The evidence just cited from supply-verbs shows that the grammar of English must refer both to the notion of PO and to that of DO.
The evidence for split objectivity presents a problem for an alternative approach to primary objectivity which is proposed by Comrie 1982 with reference to Huichol-and is implicit in the work of various linguists, like Givon 1984a,b and Faltz 1978. As noted above, the verb in Huichol agrees with what I call the PO in my theory. Comrie uses the term 'prime object' for the PO; but it is clear from his discussion that he associates no theoretical significance with this notion, and that he considers prime objects to be really DO's. His claim is thus that Huichol differs from other languages in how it associates semantic roles with grammatical relations: in other languages it is the patient/theme which is the DO, but in Huichol it is the recipient/beneficiary. What the patient/ theme is, on Comrie's analysis, is not clear, but it is not a DO. His theory is thus reminiscent of claims (as in Keenan 1976 , Keenan & Comrie 1977 , and Marantz 1984 that, in at least some ergative languages, the absolutive is 'really' the subject; such ergative languages are said to differ from other languages in what semantic roles are associated with the grammatical relation SUBJECT. But just as split ergativity presents a problem for such a view of ergativity, so too split objectivity presents a problem for Comrie's proposal about objects. His proposal requires that every language be one of two types-(a) one in which the patient/theme in a ditransitive clause is the DO, or (b) one in which the recipient/beneficiary is the DO. But if there are languages in which some rules group the single object in monotransitive clauses with the patient/theme in ditransitive clauses, while other rules group it with the recipient/beneficiaryin other words, if some rules refer to what are DO's on my analysis, but others to PO's-then Comrie's approach will not work. We need to recognize two grammatical relations for describing such languages, and the distinct notions PO and DO serve that function. Given that the theory requires these two notions, it is clearly PO, not DO, which is relevant to the verb agreement rule in Huichol.
Although primary objectivity is really a property of rules rather than of languages, I will continue to refer to PO and DO languages loosely, as a way of referring to types in which many rules refer to PO's and DO's respectively. Thus, even though the grammar of English may refer to the category IO, it is convenient to describe English as a PO language, since the grammatical relation PO seems to play a more central role in the grammar. In other languages, however, it is the DO that advances to Subject. In a French sentence like 65a, it is the DO that advances to Subject, as shown in 23 For some speakers, 63c is acceptable. I discuss this below. 'Mary has been given the book by John.' Clearly the fact that, in English, the PO advances to Subject-while in French, the DO does so-is not an accidental difference between the two languages. The role of the PO in English is related to the general prominence that the notion PO plays in English in contrast to French. But I leave it to a future general theory of split ergativity and split objectivity to account for these facts.
THREE KINDS OF PASSIVE. The traditional RG view is that
A third kind of Passive is found in some languages, in which ANY object can advance to Subject. Thus, if we apply Passive to the Kinyarwanda sentence in 66a, either object can advance to Subject, as shown in 66b-c: are acceptable. Although a number of informal proposals have been made within RG to account for the acceptability of 63c for such speakers, no satisfactory account has been found within the classical 10 Advancement approach. Ex. 63c is the passive of 63a (John gave Mary the book); but the book is a chomeur in 63a on the classical analysis, and hence ought not to be advanceable to subject. It has been suggested that these sentences involve advancement of the 10 to DO AFTER the DO the book advances to subject.25 But this leaves the problem of why such an advancement is not also possible for the majority of speakers of English who find 63c unacceptable. Presumably the grammars of such speakers include something to prevent the IO from advancing to DO after the DO advances to Subject. But this approach would in effect require an account of the difference between the two 'dialects' in terms of what amounts to extrinsic ordering-something RG has otherwise avoided. The approach proposed in this paper allows for an account of the difference between the two 'dialects' in terms of an independently motivated parameter of cross-linguistic variation: for some speakers, passive is the advancement of the PO to Subject, while for others it is the advancement of any object to Subject. What is particularly significant about both these examples is that the verb agrees with the notional DO mzinhigan 'book': the final suffix -n indicates an inanimate object. As discussed above, ditransitive verbs in Ojibwa generally agree with the PO, not the SO. The natural conclusion is that the loss of PO status by the notional IO, resulting from these rules, causes the SO to take over the PO relation. This cannot be automatic, however. The evidence cited above from Swahili shows that the SO remains as such when the DO advances to Su. Although the different rules at work in the two cases (passive vs. reflexivization/ unspecified object deletion) might play a role in predicting this difference, I assume that it must be stipulated for Ojibwa that SO's advance to PO in such clauses. It should be emphasized that the facts just discussed provide an additional argument for a PO analysis of Ojibwa, in contrast to the obligatory 10 Advancement analysis of Rhodes since it is affected by the rule, it must conform to the correspondence in 74a after the rule has applied. By 74b(ii), the original PO a pie is also affected by the rule, since the rule application results in Mary acquiring the PO relationwhich is already held by a pie. As a result, a pie must conform to 74a; if it retains its status as DO at the final level, then it must also be SO, since the clause is ditransitive at the final level.30
There are a number of reasons for treating sentences like 77 as basic, rather than ones like 78. The benefactive nominal in 78 otherwise behaves like a final term in its case-marking and position. We can account for that directly if it is a final term. Since its semantic properties would suggest that it is an initial non-term, it must have advanced to become a term. Conversely, the benefactive in 77 has the case-marking and position of a final non-term. Since it is an initial non-term, we can account for the facts if we treat 77 as basic. We might account for these properties if the initial benefactive were a final chomeur-as I have argued is true with IO's marked with to. But there is no plausible way by which it might become a chomeur. For an initial non-term to become a final chomeur, it must first advance to become a term, and subsequently be placed 'en chomage' by the advancement of another nominal. Quite apart from the fact that such a scenario is otherwise either rare or impossible, the complexity of such an analysis seems quite unmotivated compared to the one assumed here.
The RG literature provides extensive documentation on advancements to object. In most cases, it is assumed that the advancement is to DO. The framework presented in this paper allows for four possible types of advancement to object, since there are four types of object to which a nominal might advance. Whether the full range of four possibilities is attested among the languages of the world is a matter for future research. But I will present evidence here for advancement to SO in Kinyarwanda.
Kimenyi describes an elaborate system of advancements to object in Kinyarwanda, but I will restrict attention to Instrumental Advancement: The question of why language should exhibit both DO/IO and PO/SO distinctions is similar to that of why language should exhibit both subject/object and absolutive/ergative distinctions. I will address the second question first, and then show that an analogous answer applies to the first. Although the absolutive/ergative distinction often strikes people as bizarre, the relationship between grammatical relations and semantic roles in an ergative language is in many ways more direct than it is in an accusative language. It seems fair to say that the PROTOTYPICAL subject of a transitive verb is an agent, while the prototypical object of a transitive verb and the prototypical subject of an intransitive verb is a patient/theme. In other words, the prototypical ergative nominal is an agent, while the prototypical absolutive nominal is a patient/ theme (cf. Anderson 1977 , Keenan 1984 The ergative/absolutive distinction is thus essentially a grammaticization of the semantic distinction between non-theme agents and patient/themes.31
What this means is that, in a language (like English) in which the subject/ object distinction is prominent, patient/themes will not be expressed by a single grammatical relation; rather they will be expressed in an intransitive clause by the subject, in a transitive clause by the object. As a result, English has many verbs whose transitive and intransitive uses are rather different, in that the intransitive subject corresponds semantically to the transitive object. The verb open is a well-known example: This phenomenon does not occur in an ergative language, since the patient/ theme will be the absolutive in both situations. The subject/object distinction, however, is linked more closely to discourse/ referential/pragmatic structure. Subjects of transitive clauses tend to be moe 'topical': they are more often definite, human, or non-3rd person than are objects. Subjects of intransitive clauses tend to be more like subjects of transitive clauses in this respect. Hence the subject/object distinction can be viewed as the grammaticization of 'more topical' vs. 'less topical'. The ergative/absolutive and Subject/Object distinctions differ in that the former is linked to semantic roles, the latter to discourse/pragmatic function.32
Analogous comments apply to the two types of distinctions made with objects. The DO/IO distinction follows semantic roles more closely: the DO of either a monotransitive or a ditransitive clause is prototypically a patient/theme, while the 10 is a recipient/beneficiary. The PO/SO distinction, in contrast, is linked more closely to discourse/pragmatic function. In ditransitive clauses, the 10 tends to be more 'topical' than the DO, since the IO is generally human and definite, and often 1st or 2nd person; the DO is generally non-human and indefinite, and almost invariably 3rd person. In the terminology of Givon 1979 Givon , 1984a , the 10 in a ditransitive clause is a 'secondary clausal topic'. In a monotransitive clause, the DO is the secondary clausal topic, being more topical than oblique nominals. Thus the PO/SO distinction can be viewed as a grammaticization of secondary topic vs. non-topic.
The fact that languages like Ojibwa and Huichol have systems of object affixes on verbs which vary with the PO, and not with the SO, is not surprising, given the above functional considerations. Since 10's vary for person, while DO's in ditransitive clauses generally do not, it makes more sense functionally for the verb in a ditransitive clause to code the person of the IO rather than the person of the DO, since the latter is generally predictable.
In fact, if a language has grammatical rules such that the verb only codes the person/number of human objects, then it will seem to be a PO language-since, except in highly unusual circumstances, only PO's will be human. But to describe such a language as of PO type would be misleading, since the rules in question would actually refer to human objects. And it is quite possible that some of the languages cited above as of PO type are really languages in which rules refer to human objects or non-3rd person objects, rather than PO objects. Scott DeLancey has suggested to me that this is a likely alternative for a number of Tibeto-Burman languages. It is often difficult to determine from the available sources whether this is true. If one re-examines the individual arguments given in ??2-3, however, such an alternative generally proves unworkable. Object affixes in Ojibwa occur with inanimate objects. The Huichol examples involve human SO's. The Kokborok example involves an inanimate IO. Hence, even though something along the lines of a human/non-human distinction is a likely diachronic source for primary objectivity, that distinction has apparently often been grammaticized and re-analysed as a PO/SO distinction.
One interesting property of the general picture sketched here is that the PO/ SO and Subject/Object distinctions are alike in that both are linked to discourse/ pragmatic function; but the DO/IO and absolutive/ergative distinctions are alike in that both are related to semantic roles. Whether there are ways in which the PO/SO distinction behaves grammatically more like the Subject/Object distinction than the absolutive/ergative distinction, and conversely for the DO/IO distinction, is a matter for future research. 33 
